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Beyond Baehr: 
Strengthening The Definition of Marriage 
Katherine Shaw Spaht" 
Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. Shrieking voices 
Scolding, mocking, or merely chattering, 
Always assail them. 
-from T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, 
FOUR QUARTETS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is one of the curiosities of the strange age in which we live that the 
word "marriage" has lost much of its cultural meaning. The "shrieking 
voices" of America's most influential opinion-shapers, which relentlessly 
* Copyright © !998 by Katherine Shaw Spaht. Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor 
of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. This text was originally delivered in November, 1997 
at Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years, at the Catholic 
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of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at Brigham Young University. Additionally, the 
author drafted Louisiana's Covenant Marriage legislation. 
The author wishes to express her gratitude to her husband of twenty-six years, Paul H. Spaht, 
with whom she is now married in a "Covenant Marriage" for his patience and support throughout 
the 1997 legislative session and its aftermath; to Representative Tony Perkins, the representative who 
authored the "Covenant Marriage" legislation and selected it from among many options a~ the most 
appropriate way to change divorce law; to Mr. Marshall Shaw, her brother and best friend who 
offered advice and editing assistance; to Ms. Candace Cenac, her research assistant who compiled 
two notebooks of state statutes and judicial opinions passed and rendered since Baehr v. Miike for 
the conference in Washington, D.C. and who prepared a memorandum on the effects of divorce on 
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assail the traditional meaning of marriage, have had their effect in legal 
arenas as well as in the broader culture. The culture wars of the late twenti-
eth century thus find a focus in the intensifying struggle over how to de-
fine the word "marriage" as a legal term of art. 
Past generations did not necessarily require a legally binding definition 
of marriage, for people who are instructed in the tenets of Christian moral-
ity have an instinctive understanding of what the word means. The re-
ceived model of Christian marriage is grounded in universal truths, natural 
orders,1 and enduring moral boundaries.2 As a unique institution, Christian 
marriage has traditionally been defined by three elements: 1) sexual com-
plementarity, the "ordering" purpose of which is procreation; 2)mutual 
faithfulness; and 3) "the special bond of permanence conferred by God as 
a 'sacrament,' a gift of grace."3 
The modem meaning of the word "marriage," understood as a legal 
term of art, began to evolve away from this religiously grounded definition 
concurrently with the de-Christianization of the broader American culture. 
This evolution in meaning accelerated at the end of the 1960s, as federal 
judges began more actively to reshape the law of the family to accord with 
their own secularized ideals. It has now culminated in the current debate 
over same-sex marriage, which is frequently dominated by popular cul-
ture's "shrieking voices." 
The evolution of the definition of marriage manifested in judicial opin-
ions began with the United States Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Lov-
ing v. Virginia4 and culminated in Baehr v. Miike,5 a 1993 decision of the 
Hawaii Supreme Court. In Loving v. Virginia marriage begins as a tradi-
tionally understood relationship and progressively evolves into a vehicle 
for publicly expressed personal fulfillment. No doubt the evolution of the 
definition of marriage6 partially influenced the discovery of a constitu-
tional right to intimate association of a lesbian couple recently recognized 
I. Professor Coolidge in his article in South Texas Law Review referred to marriage as a 
sexually-defined "community" known to man through reason and conscience (universal principles). 
The traditional model of "marriage" merely reflected man's attempt to implement the universal 
principles in the form of human law. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike 
and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. I, 33, 40 (1997). 
2. Jd. at 31. 
3. Id. 
4. 388 U.S. I (1967). 
5. 852 P.2d 44(1993). 
6. See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse? Behind the Movement for Gay Marriage Lies 
a Deeper Issue: What is Marriage for, and Why is it in Trouble? THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, 
at 18. 
277] DEFINING MARRIAGE BEYOND BAEHR 279 
in Shahar v. Bowers/ a decision ultimately vacated by a three-judge panel, 
then reversed by an en bane panel of the United States Court of Appeal. 
Reacting to the specter of Baehr's recognition of same-sex marriage, 
we "The People" through our state and federal representatives responded 
overwhelmingly and almost immediately by defining "marriage" in statu-
tory terms as a union between one man and one woman. 8 Yet, we "The 
People" ourselves bear responsibility for diminishing the definitional 
model of marriage and progressively diluting its meaning. Marriage in ju-
dicial opinions evolved from an institution into a personal right, an evolu-
tion condoned by "The People" who welcomed a far less restrictive and 
binding personal arrangement, freeing the individual from the oppression 
of a sacred relationship. Thus, do we "The People" indignantly reap what 
we sow, all the while ignorant that we "The People" bear the responsibil-
ity. 
To strengthen the definition of marriage as a unique institution and to 
restore its meaning, we "The People" must not only assure that marriage 
contains the defining element of sexual complementarity represented by 
the union of a man and a woman, but also that it contains the elements of 
mutual faithfulness, and more importantly, "the special bond of perma-
nence."9 Despite the fact that the traditional model of marriage has "re-
tained a strong hold on the American cultural and legal imagination,"10 we 
"The People" abandoned marriage's "special bond of permanence" first by 
permitting increasingly easier divorce. To strengthen the definition of mar-
riage it is essential that we "The People" enact laws that make divorce 
more difficult. For it is only by promoting the defining element of mar-
riage, permanence-which represents the ultimate self-sacrifice-that we 
"The People" can silence the "shrieking voices" that continue to assail the 
institution of marriage, as traditionally understood. 
This paper will examine the crisis concerning the definition of mar-
riage and its effect on marriage as a social institution in three steps. First, it 
will trace the evolution of the legal definition of marriage through the judi-
cial opinions of the past thirty or so years. Second, it will examine the re-
sponse of we "The People" to the crisis facing marriage as an institution. 
Third, it will propose a solution to the crisis through the use of "Covenant 
Marriage" which will act to restore permanence to marriage thereby return-
ing it to its status as a social institution. 
7. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995), vacated, reh'g en bane granted, 78 F.3d 499 (lith Cir. 
1996) (upholding vacated opinion), reh'g denied, 120 F/3d 2ll (1997), rev'd, ll4 F.3d 1097 (llth 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _U.S._ (No. 97-751, Jan. 12, 1998). 
8. See infra notes 46-50. 
9. Coolidge, supra note I, at 31. 
10. /d. at 33. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE IN JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS 
In Loving v. Virginian the recognition of the right to marry as funda-
mental entailed a description of marriage as one of the" 'basic civil rights 
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."12 Later in the 
opinion, the court describes the freedom to marry as "one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."13 A 
right described as essential to the existence and survival of mankind and 
essential to the orderly14 pursuit of happiness is entirely consistent with the 
traditional model of marriage. However, the focus on marriage as a per-
sonal right in the description in Loving transforms an institution of society 
into a personal right of the individual seeking to marry which allows them 
to be free of certain governmental restrictions on that right. 
Considered as an institution, rather than merely a personal right, the 
definition of marriage focuses on the unit of husband and wife, committed 
to each other and forming the foundation of another institution, the family, 
which is essential for the training of children "to participate in the reli-
gious, civil and political life of society."15 Described as a personal right 
essential to the pursuit of happiness, however, the emphasis shifts to the 
individual and why he or she desires to marry. Thus, language probably 
not intended to affect drastically the traditional model of marriage becomes 
the seed for the description almost twenty years later in Turner v. Saflei 6 
of the important attributes of marriage. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Turner, decided that for incarcer-
ated inmates certain important attributes of marriage remain, and those 
attributes are sufficient to create a constitutionally protected marital rela-
tionship "in the prison context."17 The attributes described as sufficient to 
constitute the core of the "right to marry" include: (1) "expressions of 
emotional support and public commitment,"18 a form of personal dedica-
tion; (2) "an exercise of religious faith," 19 giving the marriage a spiritual 
dimension; (3) "the expectation that marriage will be fully consum-
II. 388 U.S. I. 
12. /d. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (emphasis added). 
13. /d. (emphasis added). 
14. Use of the word "orderly" suggests that pursuit of happiness requires modification by an 
adjective understood to qualifY the individual pursuit of happiness by the imposition of constrictions 
in the natural order of things (natural law). 
15. Coolidge, supra note I, at 31. 
16. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
17. /d. at 96. 
18. /d. at 95. 
19. /d. at 96. 
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mated";20 and (4) "the receipt of government benefits."21 Obviously, such a 
conception of marriage, or the marital relationship is predicated on the per-
spective of the individual person who seeks to achieve personal happiness 
from marriage. What remains of the traditional model of marriage is a hint 
of sexual complementarity conveyed by the word "consummated," but 
without reference to the ordering purpose of procreation.22 
The description of a marital relationship in Turner almost twenty years 
after Loving suggests much had happened in American society in the inter-
vening years to reduce marriage to a personal right to be pursued by the 
individual with the intention of accomplishing, at least as articulated, self-
ish purposesY By comparison, the new conception of marriage articulated 
in Turner bears little resemblance to the traditional model of marriage as a 
unique institution defined by: sexual complementarity for the purpose of 
procreation; mutual faithfulness; and the special bond of permanence con-
ferred by God as a "sacrament. "24 The attributes of marriage described in 
the Turner case could be ascribed to a contract of donation to a church for 
the purpose of establishing a counseling center in your name. The evolu-
tion in meaning of marriage occurred despite the general warning not to 
expand constitutional rights by redefining them, a warning that came from 
the same United States Supreme Court in the same year Turner was de-
cided.25 
20. /d. 
21. /d. 
22. Coolidge, supra note 1, at 31; See also Rick Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth 
of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"? 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 
587 (1996); Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf Supreme Court Storytelling, The 
Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (1996). 
23. See Christopher Wolfe, 171e Marriage of Your Choice, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1995, at 37-38. 
Wolfe also wrote: 
/d. 
/d. 
No-fault divorce legislation was, from one perspective, merely part of a larger 
cultural change that expanded personal autonomy, not merely in maniage laws, but in the 
area of sexuality generally (and more broadly as well). It is surely not the sole cause of 
declining family stability." 
On the other hand, even if it is, to a considerable extent, an epiphenomenon of 
deeper cultural changes, once ensconced in the law, divorce becomes part of the "moral 
ecology'" of our culture and shapes the attitudes and expectations of many citizens about 
marriage. 
24. See Coolidge, supra note I, at 31. 
25. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-5 (1986). The Court stated: 
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new 
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause . . . . 
. . . There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of 
those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category, or rights deemed to be 
fundamental. 
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The evolving social conception of marriage articulated in United 
States Supreme Court opinions from an institution to the individual's right 
to pursue personal happiness26 led not illogically seven years later in Baehr 
v. Miike21 to a challenge by persons denied such a personal right28 by state 
statute. State statutes and judicial opinions,29 by virtue of the universal ac-
ceptance of the traditional understanding of the meaning of marriage, obvi-
ously denied such a personal right to persons of the same sex just as others 
are also denied the right to marry because they fall outside the traditional 
understanding of the meaning of marriage.30 Even though Baehr v. Miike31 
ultimately concluded that the right was not "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sac-
Interestingly, the Bowers case had occasion to comment on marriage: "No connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent." /d. at 191; See Richard F. Duncan, 
The Narrow and Shallow Bit of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A 
(Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 147 (1997) (concluding 
that the Bowers case is unaffected by Romer v. Evans, I 16 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). 
Naturaiiy, the Bowers case has been the target of many scholarly critiques, especially as the 
debate about same-sex marriage has intensified. Nonetheless, the same caution about discovery of 
new fundamental rights, or the redefining of such rights, was repeated three years later in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. IIO (1989). According to the Court, identifying a fundamental right. such 
as marriage, requires identifying "the most specific level at which [there is] a relevant tradition 
protecting the asserted right .... " /d. at 127-28, n.6. 
26. "Rights talk" is eloquently explored in Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). 
27. 852 P.2d 44. 
28. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1419, 1427-28 (1993), for a sympathetic view of the extension of "marriage" to same-sex couples. 
Professor Eskridge's article is simply one example among many such articles. For a contrary view, 
see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 312 (1992); see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential 
Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 601. 
America's concentration on rights rather than responsibilities in their legal conversations is 
discussed in GLENDON, supra note 26. 
29. See infra notes 46-50; Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, 65 USLW 2399 (Hawaii Cir.Ct. 
Dec.3, 1996). 
30. For example polygamy is prohibited in aU states so that a person who is already married 
cannot marry another. In addition, those related by blood, and in some cases adoption, within certain 
degrees, which vary from state to state, are prohibited from marrying. 
31. 852 P.2d 44. The Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the lower court's order and remanded 
the case for a decision not inconsistent with their opinion. Although the Hawaii Supreme Court 
refused to extend the right of privacy to protect same-sex couples in their right to marry, the Court 
did hold that sex is a "suspect category" for purposes of equal protection analysis under Article I, 
§ 5 of the Hawaii Constitution. The majority further held that HRS 572- I was subject to "strict 
scrutiny" and presumed unconstitutional unless the State of Hawaii could show that there were 
compelling state interests to justify the sex-based classification and that the statute was narrowly 
drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement on the applicant's constitutional rights. 
On remand, the First Circuit Court of Hawaii ruled that the state did not have a compeiiing 
interest in preventing same-sex couples from obtaining a marriage license. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, reprinted in 23 Fam. L. Rep. 2001 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). For an 
excellent account of the political and legal history to this point, see Coolidge, supra note I. 
For a detailed account of the continuing litigation, see David Orgon Coolidge, in this 
symposium. 
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rificed,"32 the plaintiffs nonetheless succeeded in convincing a plurality of 
the Hawaii Supreme Court that the prohibition against same-sex marriage 
was "an example of sex discrimination"33 under the Hawaii state constitu-
tion.34 The reasoning of the plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court relied 
in part upon the characterization of marriage as essentially a legal partner-
ship created by the state to recognize couple relationships. As Coolidge 
notes: "[t]he practical effect of the plurality opinion is to define marriage 
wording to the view of two parties, rather than the people .... [I]t is no 
longer the people's choice. The 'evolving social order' is being defined 
and enacted into law by these justices."35 The weakened definition of mar-
riage simply could not resist the incessant claims of individuals who hoped 
to obtain its personal benefits as a matter of constitutional right. 
Not surprisingly then, three years later in 1996 the federal court of ap-
peal in Shahar v. Bowers36 concluded somewhat ambiguously that the con-
stitutionally protected right of intimate association includes a lesbian rela-
tionship with contours similar to marriage as currently defined in judicial 
opinions: "[t]hough the religious-based marriage37 in which Shahar partici-
pated was not marriage in a civil, legal sense it was intimate and highly 
personal in the sense of affection, commitment, and permanency and, as 
we have spelled out, it was inextricably entwined with Shahar' s exercise of 
her religious beliefs."38 The opinion has been vacated, and reversed by an 
32. 852 P.2d at 57. 
33. Coolidge, supra note I, at 19. 
34. The Hawaii Constitution states: "No person shall ... be denied the equal protection of 
the laws. nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the 
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry." HAW. CONST., art. I, § 5 (1978). 
35. Coolidge, supra note I. at 27. 
36. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995). 
37. "What Shahar claims is that she proposed to-and did-engage in a Jewish religious 
ceremony that is recognized as a marriage ceremony by the branch of Judaism [Reconstructionist 
Movement] to which she adheres; that this conferred upon her and her partner a religious-based 
status that is apart from and independent of civil marriage as provided by Georgia law .... " /d. 
at 1222. 
38. 70 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
Judge Kravitch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reviewed the jurisprudence recognizing 
a constitutionally protected right to intimate association: 
Intimate associations involve 'choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate 
human relationship' .... In Roberts, the Supreme Court enumerated several character-
istics typical of relationships entitled to constitutional protection as intimate associations: 
'relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the 
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.' Family 
relationships, which by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life, 
'exemplify' -but do not exhaust-this category of protected associations .... Kenneth 
L. Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association," 89 Yale L. J. 624, 629-37 (1980) 
(defining intimate associations as 'a close and familiar personal relationship with another 
that is in some significant way COMPARABLE to a marriage or family relationship') 
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en bane panel, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme 
Court. Without deciding whether the plaintiff had a constitutional right to 
intimate association, the majority opinion contained the following state-
ment: "Given the culture and traditions of the nation, considerable doubt 
exists that Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to be 'married' to 
another woman." The question, of course is whether the courts are correct 
in articulating the current social conception of "marriage."39 
III. REACTION OF WE "THE PEOPLE" THROUGH FEDERAL AND STATE 
LEGISLATION 
As David Coolidge has observed the traditional model of marriage has 
retained a strong hold on the American cultural and legal imagination.40 
Thus, the reaction of we "The People" has generally been similar to the 
response contained in We Hold These Truths: A Statement of Christian 
Conscience and Citizenship, signed by numerous American religious lead-
ers and moral commentators: "[ w ]e are confronted by a radical redefinition 
(emphasis added). A relationship that fits these descriptions is no less entitled to 
constitutional protection just because it is between individuals of the same sex . 
. . . Even if Shahar and Greenfield were not religious, I would still find that their 
relationship involves the type of PERSONAL BOND that characterizes a First Amendment 
intimate association .... Where intimacy and personal identity are so closely intertwined 
as in the relationship between Shahar and Greenfield, the core values of the intimate 
association right are at stake. 
/d. at 1128, 29 (emphasis added). 
Obviously, Judge Kravitch, with the help of a 1980 Yale Law Journal article, draws the 
comparison between marriage and the relationship involved in Shahar v. Bowers, the defining 
characteristic of which is personal bond. 
39. 78 F.3d 499 (lith Cir. 1996). For an extensive discussion of the Shahar case, see 
Cornelia Sage Russess, Shahar v. Bowers: Intimate Association and the First Amendment, 45 EMORY 
L. J. 1481 (1996). Rev'd. 114 F.3d 499 (lith Cir. !997)(en bane), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (No. 
97-751, Jan. 21, 1998). 
The Court declined to decide whether Plaintiff had a constitutional right to intimate association, 
stating: 
/d. 
So, today we do stop short of making a final decision about such claimed rights. Instead, 
we assume (for the sake of argument only) that Plaintiff has these rights; but we conclude 
that the Attorney General's act -as an employer- was still lawful. 
In regard to the issue of Plaintiffs being "married to another woman," Judge Godlold reasons 
that marriage is a word with no necessary meaning: 
In a common law/statutory/traditional sense "marriage" describes a ceremony as a 
relationship or status between two persons as defined by common law or statute, involving 
two heterosexual persons, one male and one female. But as this case tells us, that is not 
the only and ineluctable meaning." 
Id. at 1121. 
40. Coolidge, supra note I, at 33. 
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of marriage as courts declare marriage to be not a covenanted commitment 
ordered to the great goods of spousal unity and procreation but a mere con-
tract between autonomous individuals for whatever ends they happened to 
seek."41 
The immediate and overwhelming response of we "The People"42 
through our representatives at both the federal and state level has been to 
make clear our understanding of the uniqueness of marriage as inherently 
designed for the sexual complementarity between a man and a woman.43 
Even the Hawaii Legislature in 1994 expressly found that "heterosexuality 
is intrinsic to marriage because the institution of marriage is 'intended to 
foster and protect the propagation of the human race.' "44 The Defense of 
Marriage Act passed by Congress defines marriage as "only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife."45 Likewise, the 
legislative responses to the Baehr decision in twenty-nine states46 and 
41. In FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1997, at 51, 53. 
42. See Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing 
Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425, 429 n. 25 (1997). 
43. See infra notes 46-50. 
44. Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance, IO NOTRE DAME 
J. LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 587, 595 n.40 (1996) (quoting from Act of June 22, 1994, No. 
217), reprinted in 20 FAM. L. REP. 2013, 2015 (1994). 
One of the best accounts of the litigation and arguments before the court appears in Coolidge, 
supra note I. His latest article, which appears in this symposium, recounts political events as well 
as litigation tactics after the 1993 decision in Baehr. See Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-
Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PuB. L. 201 (1998). 
/d. 
45. I USC § 7 (Supp. 1996). The section Act defines "marriage" and "spouses" as follows: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife. 
Another section of the Act, 28 USC § 1738 (C) provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, 
territory. possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 
46. ALA. EXEC. ORDER No. 24 (Aug. 30, 1996); ALASKA STAT.§ 25.05.011 (Michie 1996); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-101 ( Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-11-109 (Michie Supp. 1997); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit 13, § 101 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 572-1 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE ANN §32-209 
(Michie 1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE §31-11-l-l (Michie 1997); 
KAN STAT. ANN §23-101 (1995); LA CIV. CODE ANN. art 86, 89 (West Supp. 1997); !9A ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 701; MI. COMP. LAWS§ 551.1 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-1-1 (Supp. 
1997); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 451.002 (1997); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 40-1-401 (1997); N.C. GEN STAT. 
§51-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-03-01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson 
1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West Supp. 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1102 (Supp. 1997); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIAED LAws§ 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN 
CODE ANN.§ 36-3-113 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-J .. 2 (1995); VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-45.2 
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pending legislation in another twelve states47 reconfirm "The People['s]" 
conception of marriage as an institution defined by sexual complemen-
tarity. When four other states are included because of statutory,48 judicial,49 
or doctrinal 5° definitions of marriage as a relationship between a man and a 
woman prior to the Baehr decision, the overwhelming response of "The 
People" affirms the traditional model of marriage as between a man and a 
woman. 
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY WE "THE PEOPLE" BEAR AND A POTENTIAL 
CURE: LOUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW 
As mentioned previously, we "The People" bear some responsibility 
for the diminished stature of marriage. We have permitted an increasing 
dissonance between the marriage of our cultural imagination and the mar-
riage we "The People" have endorsed, or at the least, come to accept: 51 
(Michie Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001 (1993). The majority of these citations appear in 
Coolidge, supra note 1, at Appendix A. 
47. S. 282, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); S. 535, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997); 
H.R. 382, 77th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1997); H.R. 398, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997); H.R. 
1725, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); H.R. 421, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997); S.J.R. 8, 
43rd Leg, 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997); S. 577, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997); H.R. 3464, 75th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 182, 64th Leg., Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997); H.R. 2865, 73rd Leg. 
(W Va. 1997); H.R. 94, 54th Leg. (Wyo. 1997). 
48. CAL. PAM. CODE. § 30l(West 1992). 
49. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super 
Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976); Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc.2d 548, 220 
NY.S.2d 590 (N.Y. 1961). Although not counted as a state, the District of Columbia case of Dean 
v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (1995) defines marriage as between one man and one woman 
interpreting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-230, 30-101 (1981). 
50. See N.Y DoM. REL. Ch. 14, art. 2, General Commentary (1988). 
51. "[M]ost advocates of same-sex marriage fail to make the case for AIDS prevention 
because they are generally careful not to make the case for marriage, but simply for the RIGHT to 
marriage . . . Like the noted advocate Andrew Sullivan, Mr. Rotello assumes that same-sex 
marriage would have to be marriage with infidelity loopholes built in. Moreover, settling down 'for 
significant periods of time' is something less than a 'solid foundation' for the rearing of children. 
ln this mimicry of marriage, however, the homosexual advocates may simply be reflecting the pattern 
of a divorce-prone culture." Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square, FIRST THINGS, (Nov. 1997), 
at 78. 
Richard John Neuhaus writes: 
Here is a different take on the much discussed question of "same-sex marriage." Julie 
Loesch Wiley writes: 'Some Christians say that gay marriage is impossible, but I would 
strongly disagree. I would say that gay marriage is so typical for everybody in this 
society-no matter what their sexual orientation-that it takes a heroic effort for any 
couple to enter into anything but a "gay marriage.' " Her point is that what many people 
mean by marriage today is something that homosexuals can undertake as well as anyone 
else. Ms. Wiley writes, 'If you say that marriage need not be sexually exclusive, nor 
irrevocable, nor devoted to child-rearing, nor a sacred sign of anything beyond the 
participants' mutual self-interest-then you have taken away all its essential parts but, 
obscurely, retained the same label.' The conclusion: 'From a Christian point of view it 
is, of course, impossible for two men or for two women to join each other in holy 
matrimony. But from a secular, civil point of view, it does make a kind of weird sense 
that gays would want in on gay marriage. Because from a secular, civil point of view, 
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marriage, the hallmark of which is personal autonomy, a commitment with 
loopholes galore.52 Far from that traditional model of marriage, we "The 
People" first unceremoniously dumped the notion of permanent, or almost 
permanent. 
"The free terminability of marriage changes the definition of 
marriage, just as there is an essential difference between a 
contract terminable at will by either party and a contract ter-
minable only after ten years. Such laws promote a certain 
image of marriage, with terminability as one of its features."53 
In The Last Decade(s) of the American Family Law, Lee E. Teitelbaum 
explains the shift in marriage policy that occurred from the 1950s to the 
1990s: 
Until the 1950s or 1960s, the connection between family stabil-
ity and social welfare was taken for granted. The interests of 
society were understood to require that spouses remain to-
gether except in cases of proven serious physical or mental 
injury . . . . Current policy regarding marital dissolution is 
fundamentally different .... [F]ormal policy no longer re-
quires continuation of marriages that have become unsatisfac-
tory to at least one of the spouses .... [C]urrent policy ap-
proves their termination . . . . The effect of this new 
approach .... is to transfer authority for deciding on the dura-
tion of marriage from the law, which once sharply limited the 
occasion for divorce, to individual spouses. 54 
To recapture the meaning of marriage with all of its traditional ele-
ments, or even if we adopt the social pluralist model emphasizing marriage 
as a "community,"55 we "The People" must restore the notion of the per-
that's the only kind of marriage there is.' 
In the Public Square, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1997, at 76. 
52. Peter Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TIMES, August 29, 1997, at A23 
(Peter Kramer is clinical professor of psychiatry at Brown University). 
53. Wolfe, supra note 23, at 37, 39. Wolfe continued: 
[w]hat this makes clear is that liberal society is not neutral on the autonomous life (as 
'autonomy' is conceived by contemporary liberals). Traditional communities-such as 
groups of Catholics-within the larger political community that deny the absolute value 
of the autonomous life are put at a distinct disadvantage, as things stand, by American 
law. They are not permitted to make legally enforceable contracts binding themselves to 
abide by what they take to be the moral law. From one perspective, one might say that 
they are 'forced to be free.' 
ld. at 39. 
54. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Last Decade(s) of American Family Law, 46 J. LEGAL ED. 546, 
547-48 (Dec. 1996). 
55. In his article Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. 
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manence of marriage. By restoring the notion of permanency, we assure 
that the man and woman who marry make "total commitments, give fully 
of themselves, [and] nourish intimacy .... "56 It is not enough to simply 
add to the definition of marriage, "intended for life."57 When Steve Forbes 
writes, "Reinforce the concept that marriage is a legally binding 
contract .... ,''58 surely his view reflects the fact that the concern over the 
impermanence of marriage has reached our collective conscience. 
Citizens of the State of Louisiana have begun the process of restoring 
more permanence to marriage with the enactment of "Covenant Mar-
riage"59 legislation that took effect on August 15, 1997. The legislation 
permits spouses to choose a more binding, more permanent marriage60 by 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 52 (1997), David Orgon Coolidge proposes a "transmodem" model of marriage 
consistent with the social pluralist view of marriage that incorporates the following dimensions, "but 
fran1es them in the context of total sexual community . . . . The four central elements of marriage 
as a total sexual community might be described as follows: 
Consummation: a bodily union which is open to life (structural dimension); 
Companionship: a relationship of mutuality (the social dimension); 
Consent: a choice to marry a particular individual (the subjective dimension); 
Covenant: a vow of total commitment (the spiritual dimension). 
Understood this way, entering into marriage is a moral act that embodies substantive premises. 
Coolidge, supra note 1, at 52. 
From these dimensions, Coolidge derives the following principles for the governance of the 
community of marriage by the most basic institution, marriage: 
Marriage should be male-female (structural); 
Marriage should be monogamous (social); 
Marriage should be exclusive (subjective); 
Marriage should be permanent (spiritual). 
!d. at 53. 
56. !d. 
57. This suggestion made by David Coolidge is an improvement over current definitions of 
marriage, especially if coupled with required pre-marital counseling so that the couple knew what 
society, the larger community, expected of their union. I believe that more is required. The larger 
community through law needs to impose practical mechanisms to assure that the couple adheres to 
the commitment that marriage is intended for life. Supra note 1, at 58. 
58. Steve Forbes, The Moral Basis of a Free Society, PoL'Y REV., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 21, 
28. Forbes continued, "[m]ost Americans still marry in places of worship, acknowledging the sacred 
nature of the vows they make to one another. To them, of course, marriage is much more than a 
legal contract, but it is certainly not LESS than one." /d. 
59. 1997 La. Acts 1380. 
60. On the issue of permanence in marriage Christopher Wolfe argued: 
My contention, however, is that the law is not neutral. In treating marriage as a 
contract revocable at the will of either party, the law adopts one of the competing views 
of marriage. It does not permit people to really bind themselves to a permanent and 
exclusive marriage, by reinforcing the personal commitment with the force of the law. 
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 38. 
Interestingly, "Covenant Marriage" may have come at an opportune moment in history. In an 
essay in TIME MAGAZINE Lance Morrow writes: 
But off in a range of the male psyche audible only to guys and dogs, there vibrated the 
sneaking thought that the fugitive groom-however big a jerk, nay, slimeball-had made 
good an escape that men, in the yet undomesticated zones of their hearts, always applaud. 
Something in every man abhors a wedding. Not for nothing are such ceremonies 
performed by authority-and-punishment figures in black-dergy, judges. And a~ a guy 
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civil covenant61 and encourages the participation of the Church,62 an insti-
tution which possesses moral authority and is uniquely qualified to help 
preserve marriage. The Church, an institution of civil society or a "commu-
nity,"63 participates in preserving marriage prior to its celebration through 
mandatory pre-marital counseling about the purpose of marriage, its seri-
ousness, and the engaged couple's intent that their marriage be lifelong.64 
contemplates the $125,000 trap, his premature hanging, with rosebuds flown in from 
France, the something in that man's mind cheers a miracle of last-minute escape-even 
if it is an ignominious miracle. Huck has lit out for the territory." 
Goodbye, Miss Havisham, TIME, Dec. 8, 1997, at 114. See also DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS 
AMERICA (1995). 
61. 1997 LA. SESS. LAw SERV. 1380, 9:272 (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) provides: 
A. A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female who 
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship. Parties 
to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the nature and purposes of 
marriage and the responsibilities thereto. Only when there has been a complete and total 
breach of the marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching party seek a 
declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized. 
B. A man and woman may contract a covenant marriage by declaring their intent to do 
so on their application for a marriage license, as provided in R.S. 9:224(c), and executing 
a declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage, as provided in R.S. 9:273. The 
application for a marriage license and the declaration of intent shall be filed with the 
official who issues the marriage license. 
62. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(a) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) 
provdes: 
An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from a priest, 
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious 
sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the 
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is 
a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek counseling in times of 
marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a 
covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and 
board. 
Steve Forbes wrote: "The founders never intended the separation of church from state to become 
a separation of religion from public and civic life." The Moral Basis of a Free Society, PoL'Y REV., 
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 20, 28. 
63. These mediating structures or "communities" that mediate between the individual and the 
State or the market need nourishing and have long been the concern of communitarians generally, 
such as Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard University Law School. The family is the first community 
a human being knows so it is of ultimate importance. Coolidge, supra note I, at 46. See SEEDBEDS 
OF CIVIC VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
(Mary Ann Glendon and David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) (hereinafter referred to as Seedbeds). 
64. Coolidge, supra note I, at 46. Concerning the lifetime nature of marriage Christopher 
Wolfe has written: 
some people might want to have that unbreakable, legally enforceable bond for 
themselves, on various grounds. It would provide very strong incentives for each person 
to make his or her own initial decision to marry carefully and reassure each person about 
the seriousness with which his or her perspective spouse makes that decision. It would 
provide similar incentives for each of them to exert the maximum effort to make the 
marriage work, and again, reassure each one that his or her spouse has the same 
incentives. This could be viewed as one 'strategy' for maximizing the likelihood of a 
successful marriage. 
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 38. 
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The content of the counseling purposefully is not specified beyond requir-
ing only a discussion of the seriousness of marriage and the mutual inten-
tion of the spouses that the marriage be lifelong. To have been more spe-
cific concerning the content of the counseling would have been too intru-
sive into religion's appropriate role in encouraging and preserving mar-
riage. The legislation sought cooperation and assistance, not coercion. 65 
Furthermore, the legislation authorizes a secular alternative, permitting 
those who eschew religion to nonetheless contract a Covenant Marriage.66 
The declaration of intent signed by the prospective spouses after the coun-
seling restores integrity to the dedicating promise itself; for what we say 
and mean shapes the nature and destiny of the marriage. 67 A Covenant 
65. At least one Louisiana denomination failed to see the distinction. The Bishop Dan E. 
Solomon of the Methodist Church in Louisiana issued the following statement on June 27, 1997, four 
days after the Covenant Marriage legislation passed: 
In contrast to other religious leaders in the state, Bishop Dan E. Solomon, the 
highest ranking official in the Louisiana Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
today announced he views Louisiana's covenant marriage license as defined in House Bill 
No. 756, which offers Louisiana residents a second option to the existing marriage 
license, as "unnecessary," "confusing" and "intrusive." 
"The church's covenant marriage is sufficient for all seasons and circumstances of 
marriage," Solomon stated at his office at the United Methodist Conference Headquarters 
in downtown Baton Rouge. "For the state to develop a covenant marriage license utilizing 
the language of the church's ceremony is to imply that persons will be more faithful to 
their vows if the state so requires than if their religious faith so requires. 
"Regardless of the type of license obtained, for Christians, the marriage covenant 
entered into at the time of the marriage ceremony is the same for all person," he 
continued. "There are no levels of commitment or range of choices for couples married 
in a United Methodist ceremony; there is one ceremony, and thereby one covenant, 
applicable to all. Thus, for United Methodists, the covenant marriage license is 
redundant." 
The Bishop explained, "covenant is the intent and purpose of the church's marriage 
ceremony while the license is the state's authorization for persons to enter into a legally 
binding relationship. 
''The United Methodist marriage ceremony already is and always will be clearly 
focused on a life-long commitment. The language of the ceremony includes, 'forsaking 
all others,' and 'being faithful as long as you both shall live,' " Solomon said. "Also, the 
Discipline of the United Methodist Church (the law of the church) requires United 
Methodist clergy to engage in due counsel with the parties involved prior to marriage." 
Release from Bishop Dan. E. Solomon, United Methodist Church in Louisiana (June 27, 1997) (on 
file with author). 
66. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(a) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) 
provides: 
An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from a priest, 
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious 
sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the 
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is 
a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times 
of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating 
a covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed 
and board. 
67. See David Blankenhorn, I Do?, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1997, at 14-15. David Blankenhorn 
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Marriage effectively makes each spouse legally accountable for the prom-
ise he or she made. 
Covenant Marriage did not originate as an idea unique to the state of 
Louisiana. In 1990, Representative Daniel Webster of Florida introduced a 
Covenant Marriage bill68 that was never acted upon by the Florida legisla-
ture. Professor Margaret Brinig used the term covenant to describe mar-
riage in a book review she wrote. 69 Professor Amitai Etzioni suggested the 
possibility of "super-vows" in an article he wrote in Time Magazine. 70 Pro-
fessor Christopher Wolfe proposed the possibility of an even more binding 
abhors modern American marriage vows because they reflect a "loving relationship" of undetermined 
duration created of the couple, by the couple and for the couple. He makes the point in his article 
that the marriage vow is deeply connected to the marriage relationship. 
68. H.R. 1585, Reg. Sess (Fla. 1990) provides: 
Covenant marriage.-There is created in the state a union between man and woman to 
be known as 'covenant marriage.' In order to be eligible to enter into a covenant 
marriage, each party shall make a declaration of intent to do so upon application for a 
marriage license. The declaration of intent shall contain the following: 
(I) Written permission of both parents of both parties, unless deceased at the time 
of the application, or unless extraordinary circumstances render written permission 
untenable. 
(2) Presentation of proof that both parties have attended premarital counseling by a 
clergyman or marriage counselor, which premarital counseling included a discussion of 
the seriousness of covenant marriage. 
(3) Signatures of both parties on notarized documents which state: 'I, ....... , do hereby 
declare my intent to enter into Covenant Marriage. I do so with the full understanding 
that a Covenant Marriage may not be dissolved except by reason of adultery. I have 
attended premarital counseling in good faith and understand my responsibilities to the 
marriage. I promise to seek counsel in times of trouble. I believe that I have chosen my 
life-mate wisely and have disclosed to him or her all facts that may adversely affect his 
or her decision to enter into this covenant with me.' 
6131. Dissolution of covenant marriage. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter 
to the contrary, a covenant marriage may not be dissolved except by reason of adultery. 
A divorce may be granted on grounds of adultery if the defendant has been guilty of 
adultery, but if it appears that the adultery complained of was occasioned by collusion of 
the parties with the intent to procure a divorce, or if it appears that both parties have 
been guilty of adultery, a divorce shall not be granted. 
69. Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract, and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 74 (1994) 
(reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1994)). 
70. Amitai Etzioni, How to Make Marriage Matter, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 76. The 
Communitarian Network has now produced a booklet entitled 0PPORTUNING VIRTUE: THE LESSONS 
TO BE LEARNED FROM LoUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW: A COMMUNITARIAN REPORT (1997). 
It was prepared by Amitai Etzioni and Peter Rubin. The publication consists essentially of William 
Gals ton, Making Divorce Harder is Better, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1997, at C3; Amitai Etzioni, 
Marriage With No Easy Outs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997; Amitai Etzioni, Give Couples the Tools 
to Make Marriage Last, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1996, at 25A; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision-
Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.REV. 9 (1990). In the introduction to the publication, 
the authors also refer to an article by Margaret Brinig and Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and 
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 869 (1994). 
See also William A. Galston, PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 
BUILDING THE BRIDGE 149, 156. 
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Covenant Marriage: one that could not be dissolved for any reason, a posi-
tion consistent with Christian doctrine.71 
The two practical mechanisms of "Covenant" Marriage that accom-
plish a MORE permanent union are (1) the agreement of the parties to take 
all reasonable steps to preserve their marriage if difficulties arise, includ-
ing marital counseling72 and (2) limited grounds for divorce.73 The Cove-
71. Wolfe, supra notes 23, at 37-41. Concerning this Wolfe wrote: 
The proposal is this: let us amend state marriage laws so as to make it possible for 
a man and woman to choose freely to enter into an indissoluble marriage. Note: possible, 
not mandatory .... As the current legal order stands, all American marriages can be 
dissolved by divorce decrees. 
. . . Yet some people might want to have that unbreakable, legally enforceable bond 
for themselves, on various grounds. [see note 63 for his explanation of its benefits.] ... 
This could be viewed as one 'strategy' for maximizing the likelihood of a successful 
marriage. Liberal divorce law not only rejects this strategy as a general one for all 
marriages-it rules it out even for those who would freely choose it. 
!d. at 37, 38. 
For the citation to Christian authority that divorce is impermissible, see Mark 10:2-12. 
72. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A (I) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) 
provides: 
A declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage shall contain all of the following: 
A recitation by the parties to the following effect: 
'A COVENANT MARRIAGE' 
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who 
agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live. We have 
chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything which could adversely 
affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have received premarital counseling on 
the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the Covenant 
Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we experience 
marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our 
marriage, including marital counseling. 
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our 
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages and we promise to love, 
honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives. 
73. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) 
provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the parties obtaining 
counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judgment of divorce only upon 
proof of any of the following: 
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery. 
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or 
imprisonment at hard labor. 
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period of one 
year and constantly refuses to return. 
(4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce 
or a child of one of the spouses. 
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without 
reconciliation for a period of two years. 
( 6) (a) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without 
reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment of separation from bed 
and board was signed. 
(b) If there is a minor child or children of the marriage, the spouses have been 
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nant Marriage legislation reinstitutes legal separation but only for Cove-
nant Marriages74 and its availability is of particular importance to persons 
whose religious beliefs prohibit divorce.75 As originally introduced, House 
Bill No. 756 which contained the Covenant Marriage legislation permitted 
immediate divorce for only two reasons: adultery and abandonment for one 
year. 76 A legal separation could be obtained only for physical or sexual 
living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of one year and 
six months from the date the judgment of separation from bed and board was signed; 
however, if abuse of a child of the marriage or a child of one of the spouses is the basis 
for which the judgment of separation from bed and board was obtained, then a judgment 
of divorce may be obtained if the spouses have been living separate and apart 
continuously without reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment 
of separation from bed and board was signed. 
74. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 B. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) 
provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the parties obtaining 
counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judgment of separation from 
bed and board only upon proof of any of the following: 
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery. 
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or 
imprisonment at hard labor. 
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period of one 
year and constantly refuses to return. 
( 4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce 
or a child of one of the spouses. 
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without 
reconciliation for a period of two years. 
(6) On account of habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel 
treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-
treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable. 
75. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:309 A. (I) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4) 
provides: 
Separation from bed and board in a covenant marriage does not dissolve the bond of 
matrimony, since the separated husband and wife are not at liberty to marry again; but 
it puts an end to their conjugal cohabitation, and to the common concerns, which existed 
between them. 
(2) Spouses who are judicially separated from bed and board in a covenant marriage 
shall retain that status until either reconciliation or divorce. 
B. (I) The judgment of separation from bed and board carries with it the separation 
of goods and effects and is retroactive to the date on which the original petition was filed 
in the action in which the judgment is rendered. 
76. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (HR. 756, Reg. Sess. (La. 1997)) provided: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a spouse to a covenant marriage may 
obtain a judgment of divorce only upon proof of any of the following: 
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery. 
(2) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for one year and 
constantly refuses to return. 
(3) The spouses have been living separate and a part continuously without 
reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment of separation from 
bed and board was signed; or if there is a minor child or children of the marriage, 
the spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation 
for one year and six months from the date the judgment of separation from bed and 
board was signed. 
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abuse of a spouse or a child of one of the spouses.77 Obviously, the bill 
was amended significantly during the legislative process resulting in six 
grounds for divorce78 and six grounds for legal separation. 79 Despite the 
increase in number of grounds for legal separation and divorce, the no-
fault ground for divorce requires that the spouses live separate and apart 
for two years,80 rather than six months in the case of a standard marriage. 81 
The more limited grounds for divorce in a Covenant Marriage represent 
the first time in almost two hundred years that the general trend in the 
United States, as well as most Western societies, to make divorce easier 
has been reversed. 82 Furthermore, the legislation restores broader notions 
77. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:3078. (HR. 756, Reg. Sess. (La. 1997)) provided: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a spouse to a covenant marriage may 
obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board only upon proof that either: 
(l) The other spouse has physically abused the spouse who is seeking a separation 
from bed and board. 
(2) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused a child of the marriage or a 
child of one of the spouses. 
78. These six grounds are adultery, commission of a felony and a sentence to death or 
imprisonment at hard labor, abandonment for one year, physical or sexual abuse of the plaintiff 
spouse or a child of the spouses, living separate and apart for two years, or living separate and apart 
for one year or one year and six months after the judgment of separation from bed and board. 1997 
La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). See supra note 73 
for the text. 
79. These six grounds are: adultery, commission of a felony and a sentence to death or 
imprisonment at hard labor, abandonment for one year, physical or sexual abuse of the plaintiff 
spouse or a child of the spouses, living separate and apart for two years, or habitual intemperance, 
excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 9:307 
B. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). See supra note 74 for text (emphasis added). 
80. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (5) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). 
See supra note 73 for text. 
81. LA. Civ. CODE art. 102 (as amended by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, I) provides: 
Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted upon motion of a 
spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that one 
hundred eighty days have elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the execution 
of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart 
continuously for at least one hundred eighty days prior to the filing of the rule to show 
cause. 
(emphasis added). 
LA. Civ. CODE art. 103 (as amended by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, I) provides that [e]xcept 
in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon 
proof that: 
"(l) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of six months 
or more on the date the petition is filed .... " (emphasis added). 
82. For a sampling of proposals to address the increasingly disturbing prevalence of divorce, 
see, e.g., MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING LoVE 
{1996); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE {1997); DAVID BLANKENHORN, 
FATHERLESS AMERICA {1995); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 
(1987); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. 
PuB. L. 91 (1993); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. 
REV. 79; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 
9 (1990); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, 
Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981). 
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of objective morality to the relationship of marriage;83 for example, for the 
first time under Louisiana law, but only in a Covenant Marriage, domestic 
violence is a ground for divorce.84 
Had the Covenant Marriage legislation not miraculously passed, the 
author could have further refined the legislation to: (1) make abundantly 
clear that the pre-divorce counseling agreed to by the couple emphasize 
reconciliation and preserving the marriage, rather than counseling or ther-
apy concerned only with the individual adult;85 and (2) sever the explana-
tion of the different grounds for divorce in a Covenant Marriage as com-
pared to a standard marriage from the pre-marital counseling so that de-
nominations86 concerned with the teaching of the Church about indissolu-
See, also, Maggie Gallagher & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, End No-Fault Divorce?, First Things, 
Aug.-Sept. 1997, at 24. 
83. Of course, there is fierce opposition from members of the legal profession, practitioners 
and academics, to a restoration of objective morality to the relationship of marriage. See, e.g., Ira 
E11man and Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments 
for Fault Divorce, 1997 ILL. L.REv. 719; J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: 
Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 818-820 (1997); DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1991). See also Gallagher & Whitehead, supra note 
82. 
Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that a Covenant Marriage is the choice of the couple. The 
fact that it is a choice is not of comfort to those who oppose restoration of objective fault to the 
marital relationship or to those who oppose making divorce more difficult. Christopher Wolfe 
summarizes the arguments by liberals opposing the choice of a more binding marriage contract as 
follows: 
[S]ocial liberals have a great deal of difficulty accepting restrictions on divorce, because 
those who suffer from such restrictions are immediately and easily observable, while the 
benefits of such restrictions (because they flow from indirect effects on incentives) are 
not as easily identifiable. The common element underlying the two views is 
misplaced-because it is based on excessively short-term views--<:ompassion. 
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 39. 
84. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A(4) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4) 
requires that "[t]he other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce 
or a child of one of the spouses." 
A spouse in a Covenant Marriage may also obtain a separation from bed and board for the same 
reason. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 B(4) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). 
85. William J. Doherty, How Therapists Threaten Marriages, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, 
Summer 1997, at 31; Peter Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 29, 1997, 
at A23. 
86. The Catholic Bishops of Louisiana issued the following Pastoral Statement on October 29, 
1997: 
The Legislature and the citizens of the State of Louisiana have manifested a 
commendable concern for the permanence and stability of marriage by enacting the 
Covenant Marriage Act. Strong and stable marriages are crucial for children and a healthy 
society. 
The Church's understanding of covenant is a broader and deeper reality moving 
beyond the meaning contained in this new legislation. The Catholic Church considers a 
marriage validly entered into to be permanent and, if between Christians, a sacrament. As 
such, the Church requires significantly more than the State in preparation for and the 
living of a marriage. 
The Catholic Dioceses of Louisiana will continue to offer the marriage preparation 
programs and teaching on the understanding of marriage to those who present themselves 
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bility of marriage87 can fully embrace the concept without compromising 
for marriage in the Church. The Louisiana Catholic Dioceses, over the last twenty years, 
have developed a common policy requiring premarital preparation and counselling. 
Because there are elements in this particular Covenant Marriage Act which require 
those preparing couples for marriage to offer instruction on divorce contrary to the 
Church's teaching, Catholic ministers preparing couples for marriage will concentrate their 
focus on the Church's responsibility and teaching. The task to offer guidance with regard 
to the specifics of the Covenant Marriage Act will then be left to those who render this 
service in the name of the State. It would be inappropriate for those ministering to 
couples preparing for marriage in the Catholic Church to confuse or obscure the integrity 
of the Church's teaching and discipline by also providing this service, contradictory to 
Church teaching and mandated by this state law. 
For these reasons, the Catholic Bishops of the State of Louisiana will ask our 
parishes to focus on the marriage preparation proper to the Church, support the aims of 
the Covenant Marriage Act but relegate to state sanctioned counsellors the role of 
handling the state required preparation for those who choose to use the Covenant 
Marriage license. 
Diocesan Procedures for Marriage Preparation 
I. Catholic clergy are to accept either the standard or the covenant civil marriage 
license for the celebration of weddings. It should be noted that should a couple seeking 
marriage in the Catholic Church choose the non-covenant marriage license, this, according 
to the teaching of Christ and His Church, can in no way be interpreted as diminishing 
their total commitment to a permanent union. 
2. The Catholic policy of marriage preparation is not changed. Catholic ministers* 
are to continue the marriage preparation program currently being used. Regardless of the 
choice of civil marriage license, couples are to participate in the usual Catholic marriage 
preparation. 
3. If a couple wishes to obtain a civil covenant marriage license, it will be necessary 
for the couple to approach a marriage counsellor acceptable to the State to fulfill the state 
regulations for this marriage license, namely, one who can instruct them about the divorce 
laws of the State and sign the affidavit that this has been done. Catholic ministers may 
not give pre-marital instructions on divorce laws and therefore may not sign such an 
affidavit. Catholic ministers should not refer a couple to specific individual marriage 
counselors in order to preserve the distinction between these two roles and to avoid 
potential legal entanglements. 
*The term "Catholic ministers" in these norms includes all clergy and any persons 
offering pre-marital instruction in the name of the Church. 
The Catholic Bishops are continuing discussion of the legislation on Covenant Marriage for the 
purpose of considering curative legislation. Their first meeting was held on November 25, 1997, 
without definitive action. The next legislative session during which amendments could be offered to 
sever the divorce information from the pre-marital counseling would be 1999. 
87. Mark I 0:2-12: 
The Pharisees came and asked Him, 'is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?' testing 
Him. And He answered and said to them, 'What did Moses command you?' They said, 
'Moses permitted a man to write a certificate of divorce, and to dismiss her.' And Jesus 
answered and said to them, 'Because of the hardness of your heart he wrote you this 
precept. But from the beginning of the creation, God "made them male and female." For 
this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife. "And the 
two shall become one flesh" so then they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, 
what God has joined together, let not man separate.' In the house His disciples also asked 
Him again about the same matter. So He said to them, 'Whoever divorces his wife and 
marries another commits adultery against her. And if a woman divorces her husband and 
marries another, she commits adultery.' 
Another alternative to severing the pre-marital counseling from information about divorce would 
be to provide an alternative legislatively, a third option, that corresponds to the teaching of the 
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the integrity of its pre-marital counseling. By virtue of the content of the 
legislation, a Covenant Marriage requires that each heart be reached and 
each couple convinced that marriage is an institution that is intended to be 
lifelong for the ordering purpose of procreation. Without the unanimous 
support of the leaders of all religious denominations88 and with the legal 
Church-a "Covenant Maniage" that is indissoluble. Christopher Wolfe makes just such a suggestion. 
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
88. In addition to the Pastoral Statement by the Louisiana Catholic Bishops noted earlier, the 
Louisiana Baptist Convention (Southern Baptist) passed the following resolution on November 17, 
1997: 
WHEREAS, In the regular session of the 1997 Louisiana Legislature, there was 
passed what some have labeled the Covenant Maniage Act; and 
WHEREAS, The so-called no-fault divorce laws in Louisiana and throughout the 
United States, generally are considered by many to be a miserable failure; and 
WHEREAS, There already exists misinformation and in some instances a lack of 
information surrounding this issue; and 
WHEREAS, Louisiana Baptists have historically supported the position that God's 
Word clearly indicates that maniage originated in the mind of Almighty God and is 
defined by Him as a commitment uniting a man and a woman into a holy relationship 
meant to last a lifetime and not be broken except in limited circumstances; and 
WHEREAS, the intent of the legislation is to strengthen the God given institution of 
maniage and to move the legal standards for maniage and divorce closer to the standards 
of the Word of God; 
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the messengers of this !50th annual session 
of the Louisiana Baptist Convention, meeting November 10-ll, 1997, in Alexandria, 
Louisiana, encourage the Family Development Department of the Executive Board of the 
Louisiana Baptist Convention to make materials available to pastors and churches 
concerning Covenant Maniage; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That Associational Moral and Social Concerns 
Committees be encouraged to ascertain the interest in hosting seminars addressing this 
subject matter, and if interest is evident, invite the Louisiana Moral and Civic Foundation 
to facilitate the seminars, using qualified and informed presenters in this area of the law, 
along with local pastors or Bible teachers who can address this area of Biblical 
instruction; and 
BE IT FINAlLY RESOLVED, That we encourage pastors and churches to become 
familiar with the law concerning Covenant Maniage and to use any tool available to 
strengthen the institution of maniage among the people to whom we minister. 
The Baptist Missionary Association of Louisiana unanimously adopted a similar resolution, 
specifically encouraging its member churches and pastors "to marry those who choose the Covenant 
Maniage as opposed to the Contract Maniage." Furthermore, other evangelical Protestant 
denominations, such as the Assembly of God, Pentecostal Church, are very supportive of the 
legislation. 
Contrary to the position of the Baptists, the Bishop of the Methodist Church released a statement 
on June 27, 1997, four days after the Covenant Maniage legislation passed essentially describing the 
legislation as intrusive and redundant. See supra note 65 for text of the statement. 
As reported in The Times-Picayune, Episcopal Bishop-Elect Charles Jenkins of Baton Rouge 
criticized the law: 
By bringing couples in covenant maniages back to a fault-based divorce system, with its 
cynicism and occasional collusion for the sake of a divorce, 'It goes back to the bad old 
days regarding divorce and dissolution of a household,' Jenkins said. 'We've been there; 
it doesn't work. Those old ideas compromised the moral character of couples, they 
compromised the integrity of judges, courts and attorneys. 
Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant Marriage, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Thursday, Oct. 30, 1997, at 
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and documentary requirements of the legislation,89 someone has to educate 
the individual ministers and secular marriage counselors who support Cov-
enant Marriage about the process of pre-marital counseling and the execu-
tion of documents. Furthermore, citizens of the State need to be informed 
and educated about the option of a Covenant Marriage90 and why it is de-
AI. 
According to the same article Jewish leaders already had signaled little support for the new civil 
contract, but no official statement was ever issued or reported identifying the Jewish leaders. Id. 
89. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, §3) 
provides: 
A declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage shall contain all of the following: 
(1) A recitation of the parties to the following effect . . . . 
(2)(a) An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from 
a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any 
religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the 
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is 
a conunitrnent for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times 
of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating 
a covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed 
and board. 
(b) A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to or included in 
the parties' affidavit, confrnning that the parties were counseled as to the nature and 
purpose of the marriage and the grounds for termination thereof and acknowledging that 
the counselor provided to the parties the informational pamphlet developed and 
promulgated by the office of the attorney general, which pamphlet entitled the Covenant 
Marriage Act, provides a full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant 
marriage. 
(3)(a) The signature of both parties witnessed by a notary. 
(b) If one or both of the parties are minors, the written consent or authorization 
of those persons required under the Children's Code to consent to or authorize the 
marriage of minors. 
B. The declaration shall contain two separate documents, the recitation and the 
affidavit, the latter of which shall include the attestation either included therein or attached 
thereto. The recitation shall be prepared in duplicate originals, one of which shall be 
retained by the parties and the other, together with the affidavit and attestation, shall be 
filed as provided in R.S. 9:272(B). 
90. Legislators or individuals interested in Covenant Marriage legislation should enlist the 
support of an existing organization or create such an organization to disseminate information about 
Covenant Marriage, including not simply how to contract a Covenant Marriage but also why to 
contract a Covenant Marriage. For it is not only engaged couples who may contract a Covenant 
Marriage, "but also presently married couples:" 
A. On or after August 15, 1997, married couples may execute a declaration of intent to 
designate their marriage as a covenant marriage to be governed by the laws relative 
thereto. 
B. (1) This declaration of intent in the form and containing the contents required by 
Subsection C of this Section must be presented to the officer who issued the couple's 
marriage license and with whom the couple's marriage certificate is filed .... (provision if 
couple married outside of Louisiana) The ofticer shall make a notation on the marriage 
certificate of the declaration of intent of a covenant marriage and attach a copy of the 
declaration to the certificate. 
* * * * * 
C. (1) A declaration of intent to designate a marriage as a covenant marriage shall contain 
all of the following: 
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sirable in a more comprehensive manner than that provided by the Attor-
ney General's pamphlet.91 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is still too early to tell whether the "shrieking voices" of popular cul-
ture and high courts have changed once and for all the received meaning of 
(a) A recitation by the parties to the following effect: 
A COVENANT MARRIAGE 
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman 
who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live. We 
understand the nature, purpose, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the 
Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we 
experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to 
preserve our marriage, including marital counseling. 
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our 
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriage, and we renew our 
promise to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our 
lives.' 
(b )(i) An affidavit by the parties that they have discussed their intent to designate 
their marriage a~ a covenant marriage with a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious 
Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which 
included a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital 
difficulties and the exclusive grounds for legally terminating covenant marriage by divorce 
or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and board. 
(ii) A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to the parties' 
affidavit, acknowledging that the counselor provided to the parties the information 
pamphlet developed and promulgated by the office of the attorney general, which 
pamphlet entitled the Covenant Marriage Act provides a full explanation of the terms and 
conditions of a covenant marriage. 
(iii) The signature of both parties witnessed by a notary. 
(2) The declaration shall contain two separate documents, the recitation and the 
affidavit, the latter of which shall include the attestation either included therein or attached 
thereto. The recitation shall be prepared in duplicate originals, one of which shall be 
retained by the parties and the other, together with the affidavit and attestation, shall be 
filed as provided in Subsection B of this Section. 
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:275 A-C (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 3). 
91. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(b) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 
§4) provides: 
A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to or included in the parties' 
affidavit, confmning that the parties were counseled as to the nature and purpose of the 
marriage and the grounds for termination thereof and an acknowledging that the counselor 
provided to the parties the informational pamphlet developed and promulgated by the 
office of the attorney general, which pamphlet entitled the Covenant Marriage Act 
provides a full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage. See 
Appendix B (emphasis added). 
Section 5 of 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, reads as follows: 
The office of attorney general, Department of Justice shall, prior to August 15, 1997, 
promulgate an informational pamphlet, entitled 'Covenant Marriage Act,' which shall 
outline in sufficient detail the consequences of entering into a covenant marriage. The 
informational pamphlet shall be made available to any counselor who provides marriage 
counseling as provided for by this Act. 
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the word marriage. It is still possible that we "The People," acting purpos-
ively through political agencies, will retrieve the traditional model of mar-
riage and restore it whole within our cultural imagination. Louisianans, at 
least, can no longer ignore the dissonance between the marriage of our cul-
tural imagination and marriage as it actually exists; they have a choice. It 
may be that, as Dr. Peter Kramer, clinical professor of psychiatry at Brown 
University, opines: "contrary to claims on behalf of Louisiana's Covenant 
Marriage, it is out of touch with our traditional values: self-expression, 
self-fulfillment, self-rel;ance."92 As Christopher Wolfe has confirmed, 
"[t]he ideal of autonomy, an autonomy so broad as to preclude fixed, per-
manent, lifelong commitments, is the foundation of our contemporary mar-
riage laws. It is a substantive moral ideal."93 
I hope Dr. Kramer is wrong, and I interpret Christopher Wolfe's state-
ment as a "call to arms."94 How can personal autonomy be a moral ideal? I, 
for one, cannot defend those values or that moral ideal to the children of 
92. Peter Kramer. Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at A23. 
93. Wolfe, supra note 23, at 41. 
94. Wolfe stated: 
And this moral ideal is incompatible with and hostile to the substantive moral ideal of 
marital fidelity that is embraced by certain traditional communities that from one 
perspective are 'within' the American community and from another perspective are not: 
most notably, by Catholicism. This is why it is fair to say that there is a 'culture war' 
going on in our society today and why contemporary liberalism's claim to be simply 'a 
procedural republic' is indefensible. 
/d. at 41; see also JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1991); Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public 
Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (1994). 
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this country.95 How do you respond to the child whose parents divorced 
twenty-five years ago when she comments: 
I don't remember anything, except I remember living together 
and then not. I don't remember anybody explaining anything 
to me .... I didn't have anyone as support .... I spent so 
much time alone that I tried to become my own support. But, 
how do you do that as a child? I would go for days without say-
ing a word. 96 
Likewise, "[t]he day of the divorce my childhood ended."97 
Midge Deeter summarized the dilemma posed by impermanent mar-
riages and "too much divorce" in her review of Barbara Dafoe White-
head's book, The Divorce Culture. She stated, "[i]n short, there is no 
merely social cure for what ails us. But Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has at 
95. See Katherine Spaht, Symposium, Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Be a Good 
Idea for America? Yes: Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the Cold Altar of Convenience for 
Divorcing Spouses, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Oct. 6-13, 1997 at 24-27. In this respect consider the 
following: 
If, as Professor Kramer wrote in the New York Times, 'an increase in divorce signals 
social progress,' how do we explain to the children of divorce that 'social progress' is 
defined without considering their welfare? Are we willing to look each one of those 
children in the eye and respond to them as Kramer would that their parents' willingness 
to stay together would have been ... out of touch with [Americans'] traditional values: 
self-expression, self-fulfillment, self-reliance? Should we shrug our shoulders and say, as 
he suggests, 'that the divorce rate reflects our national values with great exactness, and 
that conventional modern marriage-an eternal commitment with loopholes 
galore-expresses precisely the degree of loss of autonomy that we are able to tolerate' 
regardless of its effect on children? 
/d. In the same vein Joseph F. Coates observes: 
A high divorce rate, however, can be viewed as a positive social indicator. It 
represents an unequivocal rejection of a bad marriage. For the first time in any mass 
society, Americans in the late twentieth century have had the wealth, prosperity, freedom, 
and knowledge to reject a relationship that promised life-long misery and search for a 
better one. The evidence is clear that the quest is not simply to escape a bad marriage 
because a majority of divorced people either remarry or would remarry were the 
opportunity available. 
Among the emerging patterns are a divorce rate that has plateaued at about 20 per 
1000; a widespread and ongoing commitment to marriage; and the advent of serial 
marriages. 
What's Ahead for the Family, FAMILY ADVOCATE, Spring, 1997, at 19. 
For such an observation to appear in a publication entitled Family Advocate suggests the title 
of the publication needs to be changed. It is a publication of the Family Law Section of the 
American Bar Association-the group in society who profit from the ease in the breakup of families. 
As a group, lawyers who practice in the family law area oppose any increased restrictions on divorce. 
The reasons should be obvious. 
96. Judith Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A First 
Report from a 25-Year Study (presented at the Second World Congress of Family Law and the 
Rights of Children and Youth, June 6, 1997 in San Francisco, California) (part of a forthcoming 
work in progress). See JUDITH WALLERSTEIN AND SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1990); GLENN T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE 
MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY (1997); Glenn T. Stanton, 
The Children of Divorce, THE WORLD & I, Oct. 1997, at 54. 
97. Wallerstein and Lewis, supra note 96. 
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least helped us to stop kidding ourselves about one aspect of our lives, and 
that is a help. The rest-who knows?-may require the power of God him-
self. "98 Or, it may require law that gives a couple the choice to make a 
binding civil commitment to a more permanent married life together, more 
nearly in accord with God's plan. 
98. Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square:, While They're At It, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 
1997, at 81. 
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APPENDIX A 
DECLARATION OF INTENT TO CONTRACT 
A COVENANT MARRIAGE 
"A COVENANT MARRIAGE" 
303 
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man 
and a woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as 
they both may live. We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to 
one another everything which could adversely affect the decision to enter 
this marriage. We have received premarital counseling on the nature, pur-
poses, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the Covenant Mar-
riage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we 
experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable 
efforts to preserve our marriage, including marital counseling. 
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby 
declare that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant 
Marriages and we promise to love, honor and care for one another as hus-
band and wife for the rest of our lives. 
Signature of Covenanting Parties 
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STATE OF LOUISIANA 
PARISH OF 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally came and 
appeared: 
(Insert names of prospective spouses) 
who after being duly sworn by me, Notary, deposed and stated that: 
Affiants acknowledge that they have received premarital counseling 
from a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any 
clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which marriage 
counseling included: 
a discussion of the seriousness of Covenant Marriage, 
communication of the fact that a Covenant Marriage is a commit-
ment for life, 
a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times 
of marital difficulties, 
a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a 
Covenant Marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation 
from bed and board. 
Furthermore Affiants sayeth not. 
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED 
BEFORE ME THIS __ _ 
DAY OF ______ _ 
19 __ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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ATTESTATION 
The undersigned does hereby attest that the affiants did receive coun-
seling from me as to the nature and purpose of marriage and the grounds 
for termination thereof, and did receive from me the information pamphlet 
developed and promulgated by the office of the Attorney General, which 
pamphlet entitled "Covenant Marriage Act" provides a full explanation of 
the terms and conditions of a Covenant Marriage. 
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED 
BEFORE ME THIS __ _ 
DAY OF-------
19 __ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
COUNSELOR 
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APPENDIXB 
COVENANT MARRIAGE ACT PAMPHLET99 
COVENANT 
MARRIAGE ACT 
CONTRACTING A 
COVENANT MARRIAGE 
The couple who chooses to en-
ter into a "Covenant Marriage" 
agrees to be bound by two seri-
ous limitations on obtaining a 
divorce or a separation. These 
limitations, that do not apply to 
other couples married in Louisi-
ana, are as follows: 
The couple legally 
agrees to seek marital 
counseling if problems 
develop during the 
marriage; 
and 
The couple can only 
seek a divorce or legal 
separation for limited 
reasons as explained 
herein. 
DECLARATION OF INTENT 
In order to enter into a Cove-
nant Marriage, the couple must 
sign a recitation that provides: 
A marriage is an agreement to 
live together as husband and 
wife forever; the parties have 
chosen each other carefully 
and disclosed to each other 
"everything which could ad-
versely affect" the decision to 
marry; the parties have re-
ceived premarital counseling; 
a commitment that if the par-
ties experience marital diffi-
culties they commit to take all 
reasonable efforts to preserve 
their marriage, including mar-
ital counseling; and the couple 
must also obtain premarital 
counseling from a priest, 
rabbi, or similar clergyman of 
any sect or a marriage coun-
selor. 
After discussing the meaning of 
a Covenant Marriage with the 
counselor, the couple must also 
sign, together with an attestation 
by the counselor, a notarized 
affidavit to the effect that the 
counselor has discussed with 
them: 
the seriousness of a Covenant 
Marriage; 
the commitment to marriage 
is for life; 
the obligation of the couple to 
seek marital counseling if 
1. The following is a reproduction of the pamphlet. Any changes were made solely for the 
purpose of clearer presentation. 
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problems arise in the mar-
riage; and 
the exclusive grounds for di-
vorce or legal separation. 
The two documents which com-
prise the Declaration of In-
tent-the recitation and the 
affidavit with attestation-must 
be presented to the official who 
issues the marriage license. 
LEGAL SEPARATION IN A 
COVENANT MARRIAGE 
In order to obtain a legal separa-
tion (which is not a divorce and 
therefore does not end the mar-
riage), a spouse to a Covenant 
Marriage must first obtain coun-
seling and then must prove: 
adultery by the other spouse; 
commission of a felony by the 
other spouse and a sentence of 
imprisonment at hard labor or 
death; 
abandonment by the other 
spouse for one year; 
physical or sexual abuse of the 
spouse or of a child of either 
spouse; 
the spouses have lived sepa-
rate and apart for two years; 
or 
habitual intemperance (for 
example, alcohol or drug 
abuse), cruel treatment, or 
severe ill treatment by the 
other spouse. 
DIVORCE IN A COVENANT 
MARRIAGE 
A marriage that is not a Cove-
nant Marriage may be ended by 
divorce more easily than a Cov-
enant Marriage. In a marriage 
that is not a Covenant Marriage, 
a spouse may get a divorce for 
adultery by the other spouse, 
conviction of a felony by the 
other spouse and his imprison-
ment at hard labor or death; or 
by proof that the spouses have 
lived separate and apart for six 
months before or after filing for 
divorce. 
In a Covenant Marriage a 
spouse may ONLY get a divorce 
after receiving counseling and 
may ONLY get a divorce for the 
following reasons: 
adultery by the other spouse; 
commission of a felony by the 
other spouse and sentence of 
imprisonment at hard labor or 
death; 
abandonment by the other 
spouse for one year; 
physical or sexual abuse of the 
spouse of a child of either 
spouse; 
the spouses have lived sepa-
rate and apart for two years; 
or 
the spouses are judicially or 
legally separated and have 
lived separate and apart since 
the legal separation for: 
(a) one year and six 
months if there is a minor 
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child or children of the 
marriage 
(b) one year if the separa-
tion was granted for abuse 
of a child of either spouse; 
(c) one year in all other 
cases 
A NOTE TO PRESENTLY 
MARRIED COUPLES 
Couples who are already mar-
ried may execute a declaration 
of intent to designate their mar-
riage a Covenant Marriage. 
They must sign a recitation and 
an affidavit similar to those de-
scribed in this pamphlet, after 
receiving counseling. The coun-
selor must attest to the counsel-
ing. This intent to designate 
their marriage a Covenant Mar-
riage must be filed with the offi-
cial who issued their marriage 
license and with whom the mar-
riage certificate of the couple is 
filed. 
If the couple was married out-
side of Louisiana, a copy of 
their marriage certificate, with 
the declaration of intent, shall 
be filed with the officer who 
issues marriage licenses in the 
parish of the couple's domicile. 
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